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NATIONAL BELLAS HESS, INC.: OBSOLESCENT
PRECEDENT OR GOOD LAW AFTER QUILL CORP. V.
NORTH DAKOTA?
I. INTRODUCTION
Shoppers have long taken advantage of a well-known perquisite-they
do not pay sales or use taxes on goods they purchase from mail order
companies that do not maintain a retail outlet or salesperson in the state.
Mail order companies and states have been engaged in a heated debate over
whether to end this perquisite. The issue at the core of this debate is whether
statutes that force out-of-state mail order merchants to collect use taxes on
goods sold to state residents are constitutional.' The debate is over who
will collect the use tax on mail order goods purchased out-of-state and
brought into the state rather than whether the taxpayer is liable for use
taxes on mail order items. 2 Because it is not cost-efficient for states to keep
1. See Rita Cain, The Taxing Problem Surrounding Mail-Order Sales, 68 TAXES 398,
401 (1990) (deducing from recent Supreme Court statements on collection of interstate tax that
reasoning and holding of Bellas Hess, that physical presence in state is precondition to
jurisdiction to tax, are in trouble); Paul J. Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-
State Mail-Order Sales, 39 V.rD. L. REv. 993, 1006 (1986) (opining that changes in commu-
nication technology and growth of mail-order industry render Bellas Hess reasoning outmoded);
Sandra B. McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L.
Rav. 265, 295-96 (1985) (disputing holding of Bellas Hess under modern due process tax
analysis and arguing that states can now enact statutes that force mail-order retailers to collect
use taxes on sales to residents of state). But see Timothy H. Gillis, Note, Collecting the Use
Tax on Mail-Order Sales, 79 GEO. L.J. 535, 550 (1991) (concluding that Due Process Clause
still requires physical presence within state before states can impose use tax collection duties).
2. See McCray, supra note 1, at 266 n.6 (noting that while market state can legally
impose use tax on residents using goods in market state ordered by mail and shipped from
another state, state cannot enforce tax unless out-of-state seller collects it). The distinction
between a sales tax and a use tax merits attention. A state or locality imposes a sales tax on
purchases of goods made in that state or locality. A use tax is a tax imposed upon state
residents for their purchases made out-of-state that come to rest in-state. See Miller Bros. Co.
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 343 (1954) (stating that sales tax is tax upon sale of specified
goods within state that is paid at time of purchase while use tax is tax on purchases made
out-of-state that comes due when purchaser brings goods into state). States have designed the
sales-use tax scheme to make all tangible personal property, whether acquired in or out of the
state, subject to the same tax burden. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 64, 70 (1963) (stating that equal treatment for similarly situated in-state and out-of-
state taxpayers is condition precedent for valid use tax on goods imported from out-of-state);
see also Chris M. Amantea, Comment, Use Tax Collection Jurisdiction: Retail Stores on a
State Border Held Hostage, 63 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 747, 749 and n.14 (1987) (describing sales-
use tax distinction).
States designed the use tax to prevent state residents from purchasing goods out-of-state
in order to avoid paying a state sales tax, thereby placing retailers in the state on unequal
footing with out-of-state competitors. See Miller Bros., 347 U.S. at 343 (observing that states
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track of all items purchased out-of-state by state residents, states are looking
to mail order companies to collect use taxes at the time of sale and to remit
these taxes to the state.
3
However, a 1967 Supreme Court decision has blocked state efforts to
force out-of-state mail order companies to collect use taxes on sales to state
residents. In National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,4 the
United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the imposition of a use
tax collection duty on mail order companies that did not have a physical
presence' in the state. But despite the holding in Bellas Hess,6 states have
continued to pass statutes that impose a collection duty on corporations
without the requisite in state physical presence under the assumption that
the Bellas Hess rationale is outmoded.
7
designed use tax structure to protect state revenues and local merchants against out-of-state
competition). Purchasers of out-of-state goods pay the use tax for the privilege of using
personal property that has come to rest within the state. See Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S.
207, 219 (1960) (stating that states developed use tax as device to complement sales tax in
order to prevent evasion of state sales taxes by making purchases out-of-state).
3. See National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 555
(1977) (recognizing that states impose use tax collection on out-of-state sellers because it is
impracticable for states to collect); see also Carol Douglas, State Officials Determined to Tax
Interstate Mail-Order Sales, 47 TAx NOTES 1048, 1048 (1990) (describing efforts of states to
estimate volume of sales made by out-of-state mail-order retailers in their state and state
efforts to make mail-order companies collect use taxes due on these items); Gillis, supra note
1, at 537-39 (discussing conflict between out-of-state mail order firms and states over use tax
collection issue).
4. 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
5. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining what constitutes physical presence
in state and why physical presence is significant).
6. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
7. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1401(5)(b) (1991) (imposing use tax collection
obligation on mail-order firms that regularly or systematically solicit sales in state by mail or
electronic means of communication); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-53-121(b) (Michie Supp. 1989)
(same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-407(12)(g) & 15 (e) (West Supp. 1991) (same); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 212.0596 (2)(e) (West Supp. 1992) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-8-2(3)(H) (Michie
Supp. 1991) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3702(h)(2) (Supp. 1991) (same); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47:301(4)(1) (West Supp. 1992) (same); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 64H, § 1 (West
Supp. 1991) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.21, subdiv. 4(a) (West 1991) (same); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 144.605(2)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.8(b)(5) (1989)
(same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-40.2-01(6) (Supp. 1991) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §
1354.1-.5 (West Supp. 1992) (same); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 7201(b)(3) (1990) (same); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 44-18-15(1)(E) & 23(c) (Supp. 1991) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-6-102(6)(J)
(Supp. 1991) (same); TEx. TAx CODE ANN. § 151.107(a)(5) (West Supp. 1992) (same); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 59-12-102(9)(c) & (17)(b) (Supp. 1991) (same); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-
221(2)(b)(i) (1989) and WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 82.12.040 (West Supp. 1991) (same); ALA.
CODE § 40-23-68(b)(5) (Supp. 1991) (imposing tax obligations if mail-order firm regularly
solicits business in-state and benefits from in-state financial services, telecommunications,
marketing activities or service facilities); CALiF. REv. & TAX CODE § 6203(f) (West Supp. 1992)
(same); IDAHO CODE § 63-3611(g) (1989) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, para. 439.2(4)
(Smith-Hurd 1991) (same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.43(12)(b) (West 1990) (same); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 139.340 (2)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (same); NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-
2702(21)(e) (1990) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.728 (6) (Michie 1991) (same); Omo
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Facing budget shortfalls, states view the collection of use taxes on mail
order sales to state residents as a palatable revenue raising alternative.8
States have tried, with some success at the state court level, to enforce these
statutes that impose use tax collection on mail order purchases.9 State court
decisions regarding the constitutionality of use tax collection statutes have
been inconsistent with one another10 and have presented a difficult choice
to mail order companies:" Either run the risk of accruing retroactive tax
liability by relying on Bellas Hess and refusing to comply with the statute,
2
or assume sizable compliance costs at the risk that the Supreme Court will
uphold Bellas Hess and consequently invalidate the state statutes.
3
II. SUrEwiM COURT CONSIDERATION OF Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
The United States Supreme Court ended this dilemma for mail order
REv. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(H)(3) (Baldwin 1991) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-612(C)(6)
(Michie 1991) (same); W. VA. CODE § 11-15A-6a (a) (3) (1991) (same) ; Miss. CODE ANN. §
27-67-3(j) (1990) (imposing tax obligations on firms that take orders by mail or solicit business
in-state by catalog); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-2(i)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1991) (same); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-36-70(2)(b) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-10(A) (Michie
1990) (imposing tax obligations on firms that are attempting to exploit state's markets).
8. See Jeanne Dugan Cooper, States Taxed by Catalog Issue, NEWSDAY, June 18, 1991,
at 31 (reporting that states across country have been struggling to find new sales tax revenues
to offset recession declines and want to collect proceeds from mail order sales); Edward Walsh,
States Eye Catalogues for Tax Revenue; Supreme Court to Consider Whether Mail-Order
Firms Should Pay, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1990, at Al (noting that effects of persistent recession
have prompted state governments to seek collection of use tax to prevent revenue shortfalls).
9. See Quill Corp v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991) (breaking from United
States Supreme Court precedent and upholding North Dakota's attempts to force out-of-state
marketers, without physical presence in state, to collect state use tax), aff'd in part, 112 S.
Ct. 1904 (1992); Bloomingdale's by Mail, Ltd. v. Huddleston, No. 89-3017-11 (Davidson City
Ch. Ct. Mar. 8, 1991) (upholding Tennessee statute that requires mail-order retailers to collect
state use tax based upon technological changes and benefits retailers obtain from states in
form of waste disposal), appeal docketed, No. 01-S01-9016-CH-0047 (Tenn., Apr. 19, 1991).
But see Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Bennett, No. Civ. S-088-1067, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10736, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (granting injunction against California's efforts to force out-of-
state marketer to collect use tax); SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666
(Conn.) (holding that Connecticut's attempts to force out-of-state retailer to collect use tax
were in violation of retailer's constitutional rights), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
10. See supra note 9 (describing results of state courts' consideration of use tax collection
issue).
11. See Amicus Curiae Brief by the National Governors' Association on Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991) (noting that
Bellas Hess casts shadow of uncertainty over current use tax collection efforts and disparity
in lower court decisions adds to confusion), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992); All Parties
Laud Supreme Court Decision to Review North Dakota Mail Order Case, DAILY REP. FOR
ExEcs. (BNA), Oct. 9, 1991, at G5 (stating that Supreme Court's consideration of constitu-
tionality of use tax collection statutes will help clarify responsibilities of mail order firms).
12. See infra note 212 (discussing potential retroactive liability for mail order companies
that rely on Bellas Hess and refuse to comply with use tax collection statutes).
13. See Gillis, supra note 1, at 539-41 (describing compliance burdens associated with
use tax collection statutes).
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retailers by redefining the level of Nexus between a mail order retailer and
a state which is necessary to satisfy the due process prerequisite to asserting
use tax jurisdiction. Recently, the Supreme Court considered Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 4 a case on certiorari from the North Dakota Supreme Court
that renounced the physical presence requirement and stood in direct con-
travention to the holding in Bellas Hess.'5 In its Quill decision, the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutional boundaries of tax jurisdiction. 16 Although
the Court did not expressly overrule Bellas Hess,17 the Court did render
obsolete the due process reasoning espoused in Bellas Hess.'8 The Court
held that the Due Process Clause no longer bars enforcement of state use
tax collection statutes against mail order sellers without a physical presence
in the state.' 9 The Court stated that:
[i]n 'modern commercial life' it matters little that such solicitation
is accomplished by a deluge of catalogs rather than a phalanx of
drummers: the requirements of due process are met irrespective of
a corporation's lack of physical presence in the taxing State. Thus,
to the extent that our decisions have indicated that the Due Process
Clause requires physical presence in a State for the imposition of
duty to collect a use tax, we overrule those holdings as superseded
by developments in the law of due process.2"
In analyzing the developments in due process jurisprudence and applying
them to tax jurisdiction, the Court looked to cases that reflected the
development in adjudicatory jurisdiction. 2' Although the holding of Bellas
Hess was not overruled and use tax collection statutes are still unconstitu-
tional, 22 the eradication of the due process physical presence requirement in
14. 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
15. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992). See infra notes 101-16 and
accompanying text (detailing North Dakota Supreme Court's treatment of issues in Quill).
16. See Greg Henderson, Court Debates Mail-Order Tax Case, PROPRIETARY TO THE
UPI, Jan. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (describing oral arguments
in Quill and stating that Supreme Court must decide whether to overturn Bellas Hess).
17. 112 S. Ct. at 1916. The Court upheld Bellas Hess on Commerce Clause grounds.
See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 24-37 and accompanying text (explaining Bellas Hess and relationship
of Due Process Clause to physical presence test).
19. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1911.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1910 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462
(1985)).
22. Id. at 1916. The Court went into a lengthy analysis of Commerce Clause tax
jurisprudence and finally decided, in the interest of stability and substantial reliance on Bellas
Hess, to rely upon precedent. Id. The Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme Court's
rejection of Bellas Hess and upheld the precedent on Commerce Clause grounds. The Court
noted that the underlying issue of the potential burden to interstate commerce posed by use
tax collection was one Congress was better qualified, and had the power, to resolve. Id.
Deciding that a "bright-line" test for assessing nexus under the Commerce Clause was
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the context of tax jurisdiction represents a sharp break with Bellas Hess.
However, examination of the cases that followed Bellas Hess and modern
due process jurisprudence makes it clear that this change has been inevitable
for some time.
Indeed, prior to Quill, state high courts had begun to address the
changes that have taken place in the interstate marketplace and in tax and
adjudicatory jurisdictional analysis since Bellas Hess.23 To understand fully
the potential change in tax analysis that will result from the Quill decision,
it is helpful to examine Bellas Hess and its progeny, the lower court
reasoning on the use tax collection issue and the constitutional underpinnings
of Bellas Hess. This examination reveals both the incongruous results derived
from the application of the Bellas Hess physical presence test to a changing
economic system and the ramifications of the removal of the Due Process
Clause as a barrier to use tax collection statutes.
III. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
To understand the source of the due process physical presence test and
the significance of its rejection, one must examine Bellas Hess. In Bellas
Hess, the United States Supreme Court held that a state may not impose
the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose only
connection with customers in the state is by common carrier or United
States mail. 24 The Supreme Court said that the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution 2l requires some definite link or minimum con-
nection between a state and the person, property or transaction that the
state seeks to tax. 26 In the Bellas Hess analysis, a corporation's physical
preferable, the Court retained the physical presence requirement for Commerce Clause consid-
erations. Id. Justice White disagreed, and dissented from the Court's Commerce Clause holding.
Id. He stated that the Commerce Clause aspect of Bellas Hess, along with its due process
holding, should be overruled. Id. at 1916-17.
23. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text (discussing factors Connecticut Supreme
Court took into account in addressing use tax issue in SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon);
supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text (discussing factors federal district court considered
in challenge to use tax collection standard in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Bennett); supra notes
96-109 and accompanying text (describing North Dakota Supreme Court's assessment of factors
justifying departure from physical presence test in Quill v. North Dakota).
24. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967).
25. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756. The United States Supreme Court based its decision
in Bellas Hess on both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. Id. Indeed, the
Court noted that the requirements of the two clauses in the tax context were very similar. Id.
The characterization of the constitutional basis for the Bellas Hess decision is significant. If
the dormant Commerce Clause is the constitutional barrier to use tax collection, Congress can
eliminate the barrier if it chooses to enact legislation empowering the states to enforce tax
collection. See McCray, supra note 1, at 268 (noting that if Commerce Clause imposes absolute
bar against state taxation of interstate sales, Congress can exercise commerce power to exempt
interstate sales from effects of Commerce Clause). However, if the Due Process Clause is the
bar to use tax collection, Congress cannot legislate around the barrier. See Hartman, supra
note 1, at 1022 (noting decisions that held that Congress cannot enact legislation contrary to
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presence within a state satisfies the due process requirement that an out-of-
state seller derive some benefit from a state that justifies the use tax
collection burden. 27 The due process nexus requirement ensures that an out-
Fourteenth Amendment, but postulating that Court might be more flexible in context of fiscal
matters).
Some commentators hold the opinion that the Commerce Clause is the primary barrier
to mail order use tax collection under Bellas Hess but that the Due Process Clause provides
undertones that the court must considered. See McCray, supra note 1, at 268 (stating that
Supreme Court's holding in Bellas Hess appears to be based on Commerce Clause prohibitions
with due process undertones); Gillis, supra note 1, at 542 (stating that Court failed to specify
whether constitutional ground for its holding in Bellas Hess was Due Process Clause, Commerce
Clause, or both); see also, Cain, supra note 1, at 399 (stating that in Bellas Hess, Court's
analysis focused primarily on Commerce Clause, although outcome was consistent with due
process theory).
27. See Amantea, supra note 2, at 759 (opining that Supreme Court adopted physical
presence test in Bellas Hess because presence indicates retailer is accorded benefits of local
public services, such as police and fire protection, thus satisfying Due Process Clause and
Commerce Clause considerations).
A logical question arises as to what type and amount of contacts satisfy the physical
presence standard set out in Bellas Hess. The presence of a retail outlet within a state
unquestionably gives rise to the use tax collection duty on mail-order sales to that state. See
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364-66 (1941) (holding that if state extends
privilege of doing business through company's in-state outlet, state can exact use tax collection
burden on company's mail order sales to state); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373,
375-76 (1941) (holding that when mail order company operates retail outlet in state, use tax
collection duty arises, regardless of type of solicitation used). A retail outlet located near the
border of one state that is patronized by residents of a neighboring state does not have to
collect use taxes if the retailer has no physical presence in the neighboring state, even if the
retailer makes deliveries in its own trucks to the neighboring state. See Miller Bros. v.
Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 346 (1954) (holding that Maryland retailer who sold only to Delaware
customers who came to Maryland store did not have presence in Delaware to give rise to
collection duty). But see Good's Furniture House, Inc. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 382
N.W.2d 145, 150 (Iowa) (finding that border retailer was responsible for use tax collection
because it solicited large volume of sales in neighboring state through intensive television
advertising and because it regularly serviced neighboring states' customers by delivering
merchandise in employee-driven and company-owned trucks), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 817 (1986);
see also Amantea, supra note 2, at 747 (discussing implications of Good's Furniture and fact
that Good's Furniture was factually indistinguishable from Miller Bros., yet reached inapposite
decision).
The degree of physical presence necessary to support use tax collection liability may be
slight. Even the presence of a few independent contractors working to solicit orders in a state
can give rise to collection duty. See Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 213 (1960) (holding that
existence of independent contractors soliciting business for mail-order company within state
may suffice for requisite physical presence). Moreover, the in-state activities of a company do
not have to bear any relation to the company's out-of-state mail order sales to trigger use tax
collection liability. See National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551, 562 (1977) (finding that if parent company maintains office in state that is totally unrelated
to its mail-order branch, tax liability is found); see also infra notes 38-49 and accompanying
text (discussing facts and holding of National Geographic). But see SFA Folio Collections,
Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666 (Conn.) (finding that relationship of two independently
incorporated subsidiaries does not give rise to collection duty), cert. denied, II S. Ct. 2839
(1991); see also infra note 61 (analyzing SFA Folio court's consideration of arguments to treat
two wholly owned and separately incorporated subsidiaries as one enterprise for purposes of
establishing physical presence).
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of-state corporation bears only its fair share of the cost of the local
government whose protection it enjoys, and that the out-of-state corporation
receives something from the state before being asked to give compensation.
28
In Bellas Hess, the Supreme Court analyzed whether Bellas Hess, a
mail order company, received sufficient benefits from Illinois to satisfy the
due process requirements for use tax jurisdiction.29 Bellas Hess, a Delaware
corporation, operated a mail order house with a principal place of business
in North Kansas City, Missouri.30 The mail order house was licensed to do
business in Missouri and Delaware.3 Bellas Hess did not maintain any
offices or agents in Illinois, did not own property in Illinois and did not
advertise in Illinois.12 All of the mail order company's contacts with Illinois
were via the United States mail or common carrier.33 Because Bellas Hess,
did not have a retail outlet or agents within the state, it challenged the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute requiring corporations to collect Illinois
use tax on mail order sales to Illinois residents.
3 4
In its opinion on the constitutionality of the Illinois statute, the Supreme
Court reviewed prior cases in which a company's retail outlets, solicitors,
or property within a state had satisfied the minimum connection or nexus
necessary to impose use tax collection duty.35 Because the contacts that
Bellas Hess had with Illinois were not of the physical nature relied upon in
prior cases, the Court held that Illinois had violated the Due Process Clause
by imposing the tax collection duty on the mail order company. 6 By
distinguishing between mere communications by mail or common carrier
and the presence of retail outlets, solicitors or property in the state, the
Court emphasized the importance of a corporation's physical presence within
the state to the determination that the corporation derived benefits from
state-provided protection.
37
28. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
29. Id. at 758.
30. Id. at 754.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 755-56.
35. Id. at 758 (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Scripto, Inc.
v. Carson, 362 U.S.207 (1960); Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); Nelson
v. Montgomery Ward, 312 U.S. 373 (1941)).
36. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 758.
37. Id. The relationship between the Due Process Clause and the requirement of benefits
received from the state is not discussed fully in Bellas Hess. However, commentators analyzing
this relationship hypothesize that the requirement that an entity receive benefits from a state
before the state may assert jurisdiction is the manifestation of checks on a state's political
obligation and legitimacy. See Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Thebry,
39 U. FLA. L. REv. 293, 294 (1987) (explaining that link between jurisdictional due process
and political theory is that jurisdictional issues should be analyzed in terms of state's right to
exercise coercive power over individual or dispute); Wendy Collins Perdue, Personal Jurisdiction
and the Beetle in the Box, 32 B.C. L. REv. 529, 535 (1991) (discussing idea that personal
jurisdiction must be based on political theory about circumstances under which government
1992] 1189
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The Supreme Court also weighed the administrative burden that would
follow the imposition of tax collection duty on mail order companies." The
Court noted the varying rates of sales taxes and use taxes nationwide and
the different compliance standards imposed by each state.3 9 After considering
the administrative burden and the difficult compliance requirements, the
Court concluded that the complicated obligations that would result from
imposition of collection duties outweighed the benefits that corporations
received from various local governments. 40 Thus, Bellas Hess established a
clear rule: A state may not impose use tax collection duties on a nonresident
corporation unless the corporation has some degree of physical presence
within the state.
This ostensibly clear rule evolved through application in subsequent
decisions.4' The Supreme Court's decision in National Geographic Society
v. California42 is illustrative of this evolution.43 In National Geographic, the
Court considered the constitutionality of imposing use tax collection on the
mail order division of the National Geographic Society, which was head-
quartered in the District of Columbia, for its sales to California residents."
may legitimately exercise coercive power). These commentators point to the fact that the Due
Process Clause focuses on the limits of a state's powers over individuals and corporations to
support this contention. Brilmayer, supra, at 294; Perdue, supra, at 535.
A common way for courts to justify the benefits requirement is by explaining that benefits
received from the state give rise to obligations such as court appearances and tax payment.
Even though the entity receiving the benefits may not actually use the benefits, their mere
availability is held sufficient to invoke obligations. For instance, in Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), the Court upheld personal jurisdiction over an individual based
upon his transient stay in the state. Justice Brennan based his concurring opinion upon the
benefits that a transient receives from the availability of police, fire and emergency medical
services, from the state's roads and from the fruits of the state's economy. Burnham, 495
U.S. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan was joined by three other justices.
Id. Justice Scalia's opinion notes these benefits, but states that these benefits alone are not
sufficient to uphold personal jurisdiction. Id. at 623.
One can reconcile the idea that jurisdictional obligations are a cost of benefits derived
from a state with the concept that jurisdictional tests are a check on a state's political power.
Professor Perdue opines that if a government reaches beyond the bounds of its political power
and attempts to assert jurisdiction over an individual or entity, the state is depriving that actor
of liberty. Perdue, supra at 535-39. Jurisdictional tests are a means of ensuring that a state
stays within the bounds of its legitimate authority and asserts authority only over those actors
who have "consented" to the assertion through acceptance of benefits. Id.
38. Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 759-60 n.12, 13.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989) (citing Bellas Hess for premise that
nexus to tax requires more than brief and intangible contact with state by corporation); D.H.
Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 33 (1988) (applying Bellas Hess to ascertain use tax
collection responsibilities and distinguishing between corporations with in-state presence and
corporations whose only contacts with jurisdiction are through mail); National Geographic
Soc'y v. California, 430 U.S. 551, 559 (1977) (distilling from Bellas Hess importance of physical
presence in state to taxation nexus).
42. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
43. National Geographic Soc'y v. California, 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
44. Id. at 552.
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The mail order division's only contacts with California were through the
mail. 41 However, National Geographic maintained two offices in California
that solicited advertising copy in the range of one million dollars annually
for National Geographic's magazine, which was a separate division of the
company. 46 The advertising work performed in the California offices had
no relation to the Society's mail order business performed exclusively in the
District of Columbia.47 A California statute required all retailers engaged
in business in the state to collect a use tax from purchasers in lieu of the
sales tax imposed upon local retailers. 4 National Geographic paid the
amount of use tax owed under protest, then sued for a refund.49 The
California Supreme Court held that the slightest presence of the seller in
California established a sufficient nexus between the state and the seller to
allow the imposition of the duty to collect and pay the use tax.5 0
The United States Supreme Court upheld the California Supreme Court's
holding that a sufficient nexus existed, but explicitly rejected the lower
court's slightest presence standard.5" The Court found that the one million
dollars in annual sales established more than a slight presence,5 2 and justified
the collection duty by noting National Geographic's continuous physical
presence through its California offices.53
In National Geographic, the Court clarified the prior confusion as to
whether the in-state activities of an out-of-state vendor unrelated to its mall
order operation would satisfy the requirements that due process exacts of
jurisdiction to tax. The Court's holding indicated that a nexus need only
exist between the corporation and the state, and not necessarily between
the corporation's mall order activities and the state. 4 As a result of the
holding of National Geographic, unrelated in-state company activities that
derive benefit from state police and fire protection justify forcing mail order
vendors to collect use taxes.55
National Geographic highlights the incongruity that developed as the
Court applied Bellas Hess to facts involving an increasingly interstate
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 553.
49. Id. at 554 n.2.
50. Id. at 555.
51. Id. at 556.
52. Id. In National Geographic, the Supreme Court's emphasis on substantial presence
(the corporation had an office in the state doing over $1 million in sales) and the Court's
rejection of the slightest presence standard imply that the amount of business done in a state
is a factor in evaluating the nexus. Id. However, the Court's emphasis on National Geographic's
physical presence in the state, through agents and an office, indicated that economic presence
alone is not sufficient to satisfy due process nexus requirements. Id.
53. Id. at 562.
54. See McCray, supra note 1, at 292 n.117 (suggesting that National Geographic rejects
requirement of transactional nexus and looks for any connection between seller and state).
55. See supra note 27 (describing types of physical presence that give rise to collection
duty).
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economy and an expanding mail order sales market. The Court's willingness
to transfer benefits from one division of a corporation to justify compliance
with tax collection in another division demonstrates that the Court stretched
the physical presence test beyond the facts of Bellas Hess. Thus, prior to
the Court's decision in Quill, the physical presence requirement still stood
as an impediment to use tax collection statutes. The erosion of the physical
presence requirement began at the state court level, and an examination of
state court decisions reveals how the underlying rationale of the physical
presence test began to unravel.5 6
IV. RECENT CASES ADDRESSING THE Bellas Hess Issue
An examination of recent state court decisions and a district court decision
considering the Bellas Hess rationale sheds light on the arguments presented
to the Supreme Court in Quill for and against upholding the physical
presence test. Both the state courts and the district court considered the
constitutionality of use tax collection statutes. The ways in which these
courts addressed the arguments for and against the utility of the physical
presence test in an increasingly interstate economy foreshadowed that the
Supreme Court's revision of the physical presence requirement in Quill.
A. SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon
Several state courts have followed Bellas Hess's physical presence test
and have held unconstitutional statutes that require out-of-state mail order
retailers to collect use taxes in the state. In January 1991, the Supreme
Court of Connecticut decided SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon,
57
which followed the Bellas Hess holding. 8 SFA Folio involved an attempt
by the Commissioner of Revenue of Connecticut to force SFA Folio, a
mail order retailer, to begin collecting use taxes on its sales to Connecticut
residents. 9 The Commissioner initiated these collection attempts pursuant
to a statute that imposed collection liability on companies engaged in
business in the state.60 SFA Folio did not operate any retail store or maintain
any office, warehouse, or other place of business in Connecticut. 6' The
56. See infra notes 101-16 and accompanying text (discussing Quill court's consideration
of use tax collection issue and repudiation of physical presence test).
57. 585 A.2d 666 (Conn.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
58. SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 585 A.2d 666 (Conn.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2839 (1991).
59. Id. at 668-69.
60. Id. at 668 (citing CON. GEN. STAT. § 12-407 (15) (West Supp. 1991)).
61. Id. at 669. The facts of this case present an analytical twist. Although SFA Folio
had no operations in Connecticut, the company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Saks &
Company, the owner of Saks-Stamford, a 'corporation that operated a retail store in Stamford,
Connecticut. Id. Although the two entities shared a number of common directors, the companies
had separate corporate existences and maintained separate management for day to day
operations. Id. SFA Folio maintained the "SFA" trademark as part of its corporate name,
with Saks & Company's consent. Id. The retail operation in Stamford received extra copies
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company distributed mail order catalogs and flyers to Connecticut residents
and received orders either through the mail or by telephone. 62 SFA Folio
delivered purchases to Connecticut buyers both through the mail and com-
mon carriers. 63 Factually, SFA Folio was indistinguishable from Bellas
Hess.
64
Connecticut, however, claimed that SFA Folio's contacts with Con-
necticut were greater than those of the taxpayers65 in Bellas Hess and,
therefore, constituted a physical presence. 6 Connecticut based this asser-
tion upon the large number of catalogs that SFA Folio mailed to Con-
necticut residents,6 7 the operation of a toll-free "800" number for customer
use, the placement of advertisements in magazines that ultimately reached
Connecticut residents, and the shipping of catalogs sent to the Saks-
Stamford store in the state. 6
The SFA Folio court rejected Connecticut's interpretation of the
physical presence test, stating that SAF folio's contacts with Connecticut
did not constitute evidence of physical presence. The court stated that
once delivered, the catalogs became the property of the Connecticut
residents, not SFA Folio. 69 The court also decided that the toll-free number
was not a sufficient nexus.70 The SFA Folio court discounted the signifi-
cance of the advertisements, because the mail order company did not
create the advertisements in Connecticut, nor did it place the advertise-
of SFA Folio catalogs in order to inform store employees of current trends. Id. Both SFA
Folio and the retail store in Stamford accepted the Saks & Company charge card, and Folio
often included advertising in the form of bill inserts in the charge card bill received by Saks
& Company customers. Id.
In support of the collection duty, the commissioner argued that the relationship between
SFA Folio and Saks-Stamford supplied'a sufficient nexus to sustain the imposition of use tax
collection, and that the court should treat the two entities as one enterprise. Id. at 671-72.
After examining the facts, the Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Saks & Company
had not intermingled the corporate assets and had not ignored the formalities of separate
corporate procedure. The court found that the relationship of SFA Folio and Saks-Stamford
was not comparable to that of a retail operation and catalog operation which are divisions of
the same company. Id.; see Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1941) (holding
that company which operated retail store within state could not avoid use tax collection liability
on mail-order sales made to state residents through compartmentalization of operations). The
SFA Folio court said that the attempt to treat the separately incorporated entities as one
enterprise showed a misunderstanding of the corporate structure and the taxpayer's right to
arrange their affairs to minimize their tax liabilities. SFA Folio, 585 A.2d at 673-74.
62. SFA Folio, 585 A.2d at 669.
63. Id.
64. Id- at 671.
65. The SFA Folio court used the word "taxpayer" interchangeably with the name of
the mail order company, SFA Folio. See Id. passim.
66. Id. at 671.
67. Id. at 671 n.5. SFA Folio mailed 649,000 catalogs to Connecticut residents in 1986
and 733,000 catalogs in 1987. Id.
68. Id. at 671.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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ments in magazines published within the state. 7' The court also discounted
the significance of the catalogs sent to Saks-Stamford because the retail
store did not use the catalogs to solicit SFA Folio sales from Connecticut
residents. 72 The Connecticut Supreme Court held that SFA Folio's contacts
were insufficient to justify requiring the company to collect use taxes on
sales to Connecticut residents.
73
Connecticut also asserted that, in light of the developments in both
due process analysis and the mail order industry since the Supreme Court
decided Bellas Hess, a nexus based on economic presence, rather than
actual physical presence, within a state should suffice to uphold jurisdiction
to tax.74 The state urged the court to follow the trend set by cases involving
adjudicatory jurisdiction, where contacts by mail and telephone or the
distribution of products for sale in a foreign state serve as a sufficient
basis for asserting use tax jurisdiction. 75 The Connecticut Supreme Court
rejected this argument and stated that the nature of the jurisdiction the
parties seek determines the kind and degree of in-state activity and presence
that is necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process. 76 The court
also rejected Connecticut's economic presence theory 7 7 explaining that the
degree of due process required for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction
over a defendant is not necessarily the same as that required to justify a
state tax on an out-of-state seller. 78 The Connecticut Supreme Court also
emphasized that the United States Supreme Court had reaffirmed the
physical presence test after the Bellas Hess decision and that, as a direct
result of the Supreme Court's reaffirmation, the Connecticut court would
adhere to the physical presence test. 79 Unfortunately, the SFA Folio
opinion does not offer a rationale as to why the physical presence test is
the best way'to ensure a state's compliance with federal due process
standards in determining its jurisdiction to tax nonresident mail order
companies. Instead, the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision resulted
from an application of the Bellas Hess decision to the facts before the
court under the principle of stare decisis.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to SFA Folio.80
Some commentators speculate that the Court denied review in SFA folio
order to consider Quill, because the North Dakota Supreme Court's
consideration of the use tax collection issue provided a clearer set of facts
for review. 8' While the denial of certiorari did not send a clear message
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 674-75.
75. Id. at 675; see infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (outlining adjudicatory
jurisdiction nexus requirements).
76. SFA Folio, 585 A.2d at 675.
77. Id.
78. 1d. at 676.
79. ld.
80. See SFA Folio Collections, Inc. v. Bannon, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991) (denying certiorari).
81. See States Still Expect the Supreme Court to Hear their Mail-Order Tax Plea, WALL
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on the Court's position regarding the use tax collection issue, the Con-
necticut Supreme Court's approach to the use tax collection issue indicated
deference to the precedential value of Bellas Hess rather than agreement
with Bellas Hess' reasoning.
B. Direct Marketing Association v. Bennett
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
considered the constitutionality of use tax collection statutes and also
adhered strictly to the Bellas Hess physical presence rule. The court
addressed the use tax collection issue in Direct Marketing Ass'n v. Ben-
nett. 2 After facing enforcement of a statute requiring use tax collection,
a group of mail order sellers belonging to the Direct Marketing Association
filed an action under Section 1983 of Title VII of the United States Code
(section 1983) against individual members and officers of the California
Board of Equalization seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.83 In op-
posing the tax, the plaintiffs relied upon the analysis used in Bellas Hess.
8 4
Direct Marketing based the section 1983 action on the assertion that the
California statute violated both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 5 The parties stipulated that Direct
Marketing members did not have offices, stores, warehouses,, stocks of
goods, real property or employees in California.1
6
California contended that Direct Marketing members' relationship with
the state satisfied the physical nexus requirements imposed by the Due
Process Clause. The state argued that Direct Marketing members' accep-
tance of credit cards issued by California financial institutions, catalogs
and advertisements sent to state residents, toll-free telephone numbers,
debt collection in the state, and mail order shipments using state highways
all constituted physical presence. 87 The district court relied on Bellas Hess
ST. J., June 19, 1991, at Al (stating that while Court refused to hear SFA Folio appeal,
Court would be likely to accept Quill for consideration because it presented better basis for
review); Linda Greenhouse, Court Won't Review Mail-Order Tax Ban, N.Y. Tnss, June 18,
1991, at D1 (noting that Court was more likely to accept Quill for consideration than SFA
Folio because Quill represented first time state's highest court had rejected Bellas Hess).
82. No. Civ. S-88-1067, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10736, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 1991).
83. Direct Mktg Ass'n v. Bennett, No. Civ. S-88-1067, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10736,
at *1 (E.D. Cal. 1991). The statute at issue in this case required out-of-state corporations that
maintained substantial and recurring solicitations of California customers and accepted credit
cards issued by California financial institutions to collect a use tax from California customers.
Id. at *1.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *4.
87. Id. at *4-*5. California asserted that mail order vendors do benefit, if indirectly,
from the state. Id. For instance, California argued that (1) the in-state financial institutions
used by mall order retailers benefit from state laws and regulation; (2) state residents must
dispose of the retailers' catalogs in state landfills; (3) any debt collection undertaken by mail
order retailers uses the state court system; and (4) mail order deliveries used roads which
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and stated that these contacts by California were not comparable to the
maintenance of retail outlets, employees or property within the state.8
The district court further reasoned that a retailer's use of the claimed
contacts did not satisfy the physical presence requirement at the time
Bellas Hess was decided, and should not satisfy the requirement now.8 9
In another effort to demonstrate that the mail order vendors derived
benefits from the state, California argued that the Direct Marketing
members' policy of offering the right to return unsatisfactory goods
amounted to sale on approval." If the sales to state residents were on
approval, title to the merchandise would remain with the mail order
company until approved by the customer.9' Under this theory, Direct
Marketing members received the benefit of fire and police protection from
California until title passed to the customer. 92 The court explicitly rejected
this argument by referring to Section 2-236 of the Uniform Commercial
Code93 which provides that mail order transactions such as those under
scrutiny did not qualify as sales on approval. 94 The court decided that
title passes to the purchaser upon completion of the sales transaction and
that, therefore, the mail order company derived no benefit from state fire
and police protection."
In addition to its arguments that the Direct Marketing members'
contacts with the state satisfied the physical presence test, California also
urged a reassessment of the due process tax collection nexus. The state
stressed the need to bring the nexus to tax in line with the nexus to assert
adjudicatory jurisdiction.96 The district court found these arguments un-
persuasive and issued an injunction prohibiting California from enforcing
the collection statute. 97 The district court further emphasized the distinction
between the minimum contacts test applied for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction and the nexus test for taxation. 9s
benefit from state maintenance. Id. Therefore, California argued that Direct Marketing
members benefitted from the state without actual physical contacts. Id.; see McCray, supra
note 1, at 295 (describing how nonresident mail order business consistently soliciting in state
received benefits from state); Gillis, supra note 1, at 552-53 (outlining types of benefits
nonresident mail order company derives from states).
88. Direct Mktg, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10736, at *5-*6.
89. Id. at *6.
90. Id. at *7.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *6-*7.
97. Id. at *7-*8.
98. Id. at *6-*7. California argued that the minimum contacts test established by
International Shoe should apply to both taxing and adjudicatory jurisdiction. Id. In Interna-
tional Shoe, the out-of-state corporate defendant had agents present within the taxing state,
and the court found both tax and adjudicatory jurisdiction proper. See infra notes 137, 141,
(discussing holding in International Shoe and relation to jurisdiction to tax). Although both
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The district court's issuance of an injunction created further confusion
as to the constitutionality of state statutes requiring mail order vendors
to collect use taxes. As did the Connecticut Supreme Court, the Direct
Marketing court rejected arguments that the type of contacts mail order
vendors have with states are in fact physical and thus satisfy the test set
out in Bellas Hess.99 By refusing to accept these contacts as evidence of
physical presence under the Bellas Hess analysis, these courts indicated
that the only way to uphold jurisdiction to tax over mail order vendors
would be to accept economic contacts as an element of nexus. As did the
Connecticut court in SFA Folio, the Direct Marketing court noted that it
still felt bound by the Bellas Hess decision and refused to recognize that
economic contacts could establish nexus.'
°°
V. THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT's CONSEIDERATION OF
QUILL CORP. V. NORTH DAKOTA
In contrast to SFA Folio and Direct Marketing, both of which upheld
the physical presence test espoused in Bellas Hess, the North Dakota
Supreme Court found Bellas Hess an "obsolescent precedent."'' ° In Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, the court reasoned that the economic, social and
commercial landscape upon which Bellas Hess was based no longer exists,
and thus the Bellas Hess rule is no longer controlling.
The facts upon which the North Dakota Supreme Court based its
decision were similar to the facts of Bellas Hess. Quill sold office supplies,
stationery and equipment by mail. 0 2 Quill was a Delaware corporation
with offices and warehouses in: Illinois, California and Georgia. 03 Quill
sent over 230,000 separate pieces of mall each year into North Dakota
and advertised in national periodicals and trade journals.' 4 Thus, Quill
had no more contacts with North Dakota than Bellas Hess had with
Illinois. 05 However, in assessing the constitutionality of North Dakota's
statute imposing use tax collection liability on Quill, the North Dakota
tax and adjudicatory jurisdiction were proper in International Shoe, the Direct Marketing
Court emphasized that this interchange is limited to the specific facts of International Shoe.
Direct Mktg., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10736, at *7.
99. See supra notes 74-79, 87-95 and accompanying text (describing evaluation of out-
of-state mail order retailers' contacts with state under Bellas Hess test).
100. Direct Mktg., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10736 at *7.
101. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203, 207 (N.D. 1991), aff'd in part, 60
U.S.L.W. 4423 (U.S. May 26, 1992).
102. Id. at 204.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Brief for Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991)
(observing that Quill and Bellas Hess are factually indistinguishable and have similar levels of
sales and advertising), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992). But see Brief for Respondent,
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991) (arguing that Quill's practice of
sending computer disks into North Dakota to assist customer orders satisfies physical presence
test), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
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Supreme Court echoed the dissent in Bellas Hess and urged the repudiation
of the physical presence standard for tax jurisdiction.0 6
The Quill court embraced a new. concept of due process nexus for
taxation jurisdiction. The North Dakota court first addressed the change
in volume and scope of the mail order sales industry that had taken place
since 1967, the year the United States Supreme Court decided Bellas
Hess.107 The court compared the 2.4 billion dollars of mail order sales in
the United States in 1967 with the 183.3 billion dollars of mail order sales
in the United States in 1989.108 The court found that while reliance upon
in-state sales personnel and inventory may have been necessary in 1967,
technological innovations such as toll-free lines, efficient computer systems
and fax machines have removed any necessity for physical presence in a
state to market merchandise. 0 9 Because physical presence in a state was
no longer necessary to complete large volumes of sales, the court reasoned
that physical presence should no longer serve as the test for judging
whether the corporation has received the benefits that due process demands
to uphold tax jurisdiction.10
The Quill court also traced a series of United States Supreme Court
cases decided after Bellas Hess that addressed the issue of taxation of
interstate commerce. " From an examination of these cases, the Quill court
found further support for its conclusion that the use tax jurisdiction test
should be based on economic presence in the state rather than exclusively
physical presence." 2 In order to find an analytical framework to substitute
for physical presence, the Quill court looked to adjudicatory jurisdiction
cases which recognize contacts that are not physical, such as telephone
106. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 207.
107. Id. at 208-09.
108. Id. at 209.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 215.
111. Id. at 211.
112. Id. The Quill court first examined D.H.Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24
(1988). See infra notes 197-98 and accompanying text (describing facts and holding of D.H.
Holmes). The Supreme Court mentioned D.H. Holmes' significant economic presence in
Louisiana in its analysis of the benefits the corporation received from in-state activities. 486
U.S. at 33. The Quill court implied from this reference that economic presence was the due
process standard to be applied in the area of tax jurisdiction. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 211. The
court then examined Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232 (1987). Id. at 211.
In Tyler, the Supreme Court assessed whether the activities of an independent contractor
soliciting business in a state on behalf of a corporation gave rise to tax jurisdiction. 483 U.S.
at 248-51. The Court found that tax jurisdiction was proper. Id. at 250-51. The Court held
in Tyler that the crucial factor governing nexus is whether the activities performed in a state
by or on behalf of a corporation are significantly associated with the taxpayer's ability to
establish and maintain a market in the state for the sales. Id. at 250. The Quill court noted
that contractual relations, a market for goods in the state and sales to state residents were
taken into account by the Supreme Court in its analysis of jurisdiction to tax in Tyler. Quill,
470 N.W.2d at 211-12. From the types of contacts used in the Supreme Court's approach to
tax jurisdiction in Tyler and D.H. Holmes, the Quill court derived an expanding concept of
nexus relative to jurisdiction to tax. Id. at 212.
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calls and mail directed toward the state, in assessing the due process
nexus."' The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that because physical
presence in a state is no longer a prerequisite for satisfying due process
concerns in the context of adjudicatory jurisdiction, physical presence
should no longer be a due process requirement for tax jurisdiction." 4 In
addition, the Quill court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
adapted its jurisprudence to accommodate technological changes in the
past and thus concluded that it was appropriate for the North Dakota
court to do so with regard to use tax collection." 5 Under the new analytical
framework for use tax jurisdiction, the North Dakota court upheld tax
jurisdiction over Quill and found its use tax statute to comply with the
requirements of due process."
6
By refusing to follow Bellas Hess, the North Dakota Supreme Court
challenged the United States Supreme Court to address and clarify the use
tax collection issue." 7 Quill provided the United States Supreme Court
with an opportunity to evaluate the constitutional restraints on a state's
taxing power in the context of mail order sales, in the context of a mall
order industry that had undergone significant changes subsequent to the
Bellas Hess decision in 1967.118
VI. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND CONSTRAINTS ON THE STATE'S
POWER
In order to appreciate the due process principles that shape the debate
over what contacts should give rise to jurisdiction to tax and to understand
the implications of the Quill decision for tax analysis, it is necessary to
examine the history of the Due Process Clause as it relates to the exercise
113. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 212.
114. Id. at 212, 213; see infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text (discussing changes in
adjudicatory jurisdiction and required nexus under Due Process Clause).
115. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 213. The Quill court cited Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252
(1989) and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1984), as support for the
proposition that the Supreme Court had adapted other jurisdictional analysis to recognize new
technology. Id. In Goldberg, the Supreme Court adapted the apportionment formula for
taxation to accommodate the realities of interstate telecommunications technology. Goldberg,
488 U.S. at 264-65; see infra notes 199-200 (discussing reasoning and significance of Goldberg.
In Burger King, the Supreme Court recognized the amount of business transacted across state
lines and stated that legal theory must be flexible to account for societal changes and the vast
technological explosion of recent years. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476,
116. Quill, 470 N.W.2d at 219.
117. See State Taxes: All Parties Laud Supreme Court Decision to Review North Dakota
Mail Order Case, DAILY REP. FoR ExEcs., (BNA), Oct. 9, 1991, at G5 (quoting director of
state tax policy at Price Waterhouse, speculating that Quill was written to challenge reasoning
in Bellas Hess).
118. See Brief for Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D.
1991) (noting that direct marketing industry has grown from sales of $2.4 billion per year at
time of Bellas Hess to $130.4 billion per year today, with resulting $3.08 billion per year use
tax loss for states from uncollectible use taxes), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
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of state jurisdiction. Historically, the Supreme Court conducted jurisdic-
tional analysis of state authorities to tax, regulate and exercise adjudicatory
power over corporations in terms of "doing business.""19
The doing business analysis was a judicially crafted means to obtain
jurisdiction over foreign corporations desiring to operate within a state.
20
This judicial formulation provided a method for exercising control over
corporations which were previously subjected to jurisdiction only in their
state of incorporation and in the state where they were physically present.'12
The doing business requirement offered a means for courts to define a
corporation's presence in states in which the corporation had no legal
identity. 22 Use of the doing business test required a quantitative analysis
of a corporation's course of conduct within a state, as manifested through
the presence of real property and agents in a state due to the fact that a
corporation has no physical existence of its own.1'3
119. See McCray, supra note I, at 269-71 (analyzing history of doing business standards).
See generally William A. Holby, "Doing Business':" Defining State Control Over Foreign
Corporations, 32 VAND. L. Ray. 1105 (1979) (describing evolution of doing business test);
Elcanon Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoLIJM. L. Ray. 1018 (1925) (discussing
problems associated with gaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations and describing consti-
tutional rationale for doing business standards).
120. See Holby, supra note 119, at 1108-110 (explaining that courts adopted quantitative
doing business standard in order to assert jurisdiction over foreign corporations in increasingly
national economy); McCray, supra note 1, at 269-71 (discussing various levels of doing business
standards and use of doing business standards to assess compliance with due process require-
ments for exercise of jurisdiction).
121. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (holding that
corporation can exist only within limits of sovereignty which created it and may act elsewhere
only through presence of agents); see also Holby, supra note 119, at 1107-08 (describing
conflict between traditional notion that foundation of jurisdiction is physical power and
concept of corporation as artificial person existing only within territorial confines of sovereignty
in which corporation is incorporated); Oretta D. Small, Comment, "Doing Business':" Juris-
diction, Qualification and Taxation Applications, 11 UCLA L. Rav. 259, 260 (1964) (explaining
that physical presence is traditional basis of jurisdiction and courts derived physical presence
test from notion of state sovereignty).
122. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating that
because corporate personality is fictional, presence is used merely to symbolize those activities
of corporation's agents within state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy demands
of due process); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914) (stating
that corporation is deemed to be resident of state of creation and is only present in another
state through agents authorized to transact its business in state); Hutchinson v. Chase &
Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that corporate presence must be evidenced
by continuous dealings or substantial business in state, either of which involves agents or
property in state); Holby, supra note 119, at 1109 (explaining that Supreme Court recognized
artificiality of physical presence concept as applied to corporations rather than natural persons,
so Court held that service could only be made upon corporate agent). Compare Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-36 (1878) (holding that touchstone of jurisdiction is physical presence
within state for persons and corporations alike), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 212 (1977) with Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940) (holding that in-state
earnings were sufficient to support tax jurisdiction where taxing power bears fiscal relation to
protection, opportunities and benefits given by state).
123. See Holby, supra note 119, at 1110 (describing quantitative approach to determine
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Depending on the type of jurisdiction asserted, different levels of
activity satisfied doing business standards. 124 For instance, to impose
adjudicatory jurisdiction upon a corporation, the business transacted by
the corporation needed to indicate presence within the state.'. To subject
a corporation to taxation for doing business, the in-state transactions
needed to indicate that the corporation was both present and active. 126 To
require a corporation to submit to regulatory jurisdiction under qualifi-
cation statutes, the corporation needed to be present and active and its
activity needed to be continuous. 2 7 Due process analysis has differentiated
between the level of corporate activities necessary for the assertion of
various types of jurisdiction since courts began grappling with the concept
of corporations, and the distinctions between levels of doing business are
a reflection of this differentiation. 2 The level of activity required reflects
a balance between the state's interest in jurisdiction over a particular
activity and the burden on the party over which the state seeks to assert
jurisdiction. 2 9 Constitutional limitations were also a factor in determining
the amount of activity required to constitute doing business. 30 However,
all levels of the doing business test sought some level of physical presence
within the state in order for the state to assert jurisdiction over the
corporation.
3'
if corporation is present by doing business in state); see also International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1914) (holding that when corporation was involved in on-
going solicitations in state through authorized agents, corporation was doing business and
subject to jurisdiction).
124. See Holby, supra note 119, at 1106-07 (explaining different categories of doing
business); infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (describing how Court differentiates
between level of contacts needed for various types of jurisdiction).
125. See Isaacs, supra note 119, at 1045 (observing that foreign corporation must transact
amount of business that gives inference that corporation is present in order to permit service
of process).
126. See id. (noting that to subject corporation to taxation for doing business, corpora-
tion's transactions must show corporation was active as well as present).
127. See id. (stating that to require corporation to qualify for business in state, corporation
activities must be present, active and continuous).
128. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("It is the nature of the state's action that determines the kind or degree of
activity in the state necessary for satisfying the requirements of due process."); Henry M. Day
& Co. v. Schif, Lang & Co., 278 F. 533, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (highlighting differences between
doing business for purposes of taxation, doing business for qualification and doing business
to justify service of process, and confusion created through use of same phrase).
129. See Isaacs, supra note 119, at 1019 (describing burdens that states imposed on out-
of-state corporations in order to do business in state and constitutional limitations upon
burdens); Small, supra note 121, at 262 (noting that amount of activity required to constitute
doing business and bring presence of corporation within state varies with state's desired
purpose).
130. See Small, supra note 121, at 262 (stating that amount of activity necessary to qualify
as presence and doing business varies with constitutional limitations involved).
131. See infra note 133 and accompanying text (describing physical presence requirement
for doing business standard for jurisdiction over person); infra notes 147-49 and accompanying
text (describing physical presence requirement for doing business standard for jurisdiction to
tax); infra note 175 (describing physical presence requirement for jurisdiction to regulate).
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A. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
Prior to the development of modern due process analysis for adjudi-
catory jurisdiction,1 2 states required an individual's presence within the state
to assert adjudicatory jurisdiction over that person. 33 To establish adjudi-
catory jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, states often required corpo-
rations to appoint an agent within the state to accept service of process as
a precondition of doing business in the state.' States also obtained juris-
diction over out-of-state corporations by demonstrating that the corporations
were engaged in sufficient in-state activities to constitute presence and satisfy
due process nexus requirements.
35
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'3 6 the United States Supreme
Court moved away from the presence-based, doing business analysis in the
context of adjudicatory jurisdiction and adopted a "minimum contacts"
standard.'3 7 The minimum contacts test requires that a corporation pur-
posefully direct its activities toward a state and receive benefits therefrom
in order for the state to assert jurisdiction.3 8 Although physical presence in
the state was initially a prerequisite to finding minimum contacts, the test
132. See infra notes 137-46 and accompanying text (describing modem due process analysis
for adjudicatory jurisdiction).
133. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 743 (1878) (holding that state's adjudicatory
jurisdiction cannot run beyond its own territory), overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 212 (1977).
134. See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (stating that corporation of one state
cannot do business in another state without latter state's consent and that consent may be
accompanied by such conditions as state may think proper to impose).
135. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 585-86 (1914) (examining
corporation's course of conduct in state and amount of business performed in order to assess
propriety of adjudicatory jurisdiction); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d
Cir. 1930) (stating that out-of-state corporation establishes presence in state by continuous
dealings within state which make it reasonable to bring out-of-state corporation before court).
136. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
137. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In International
Shoe, the Supreme Court considered the reach of a state's adjudicatory jurisdiction and tax
jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 311. The State of Washington had attempted
to collect unemployment tax from the out-of-state employer of sales representatives working
in the state. Id. at 313-14. The employer, International Shoe, did not have a warehouse or
retail outlet in Washington, but the salesmen did rent rooms occasionally in Washington in
order to display samples. Id. at 314. In analyzing the state's power to serve process on the
nonresident corporate defendant, the Court rejected jurisdictional tests which required the state
to demonstrate the presence of the nonresident defendant in the state. Id. at 315. The Court
adopted a minimum contacts standard of analysis for adjudicatory jurisdiction which assessed
the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum state to see if the defendants contacts
with the state made it reasonable to impose jurisdiction. Id. at 316. Applying the minimum
contacts standard, the Court held that adjudicatory jurisdiction over International Shoe was
reasonable. Id. at 320-21. The Court also held that tax jurisdiction was proper because the
activity being taxed had taken place within the state. Id. at 321.
138. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that defendant must
purposefully avail itself of privilege of conducting activities within state, invoking benefits and
protection of its laws, to sustain jurisdiction); International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (holding
that due process requires nonresident defendant to have certain minimum contacts with forum).
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evolved to accept contacts that did not require the defendant to enter the
state physically. 13 9 In the context of adjudicatory jurisdiction, a nonresident
defendant's contacts with a state by telephone or the mail are now com-
parable to physical presence in the state and will satisfy the nexus require-
ment of the Due Process Clause. 14
Thus, the Supreme Court has developed adjudicatory jurisdiction anal-
ysis from the application of artificial tests, such as appointment of an agent
or establishing presence through a doing business evaluation, to a minimum
contacts analysis that takes into account the changing face of the United
States economy. 141 However, the criteria now used to assess minimum
contacts-a purposeful direction to the state 42 and the reasonableness of
calling the defendant to suit out-of-state' 4 -are not so very different from
the requirements for presence, in that the analysis is often quantitative. 14
The most significant change in the area of adjudicatory jurisdiction is the
recognition that the Court should take correspondence with persons in the
state through the mall or by telephone into consideration in jurisdictional
analysis. 45 In Quill, the Supreme Court accepted mail and telephone contacts
into the nexus evaluation for jurisdiction to tax. 46
139. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (holding that when
one deliberately reaches out beyond state lines and makes contact with another state, contacts
by phone and by mail may suffice to uphold adjudicatory jurisdiction); McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (holding that adjudicatory jurisdiction may be obtained
over out-of-state company with no other activities or presence within state when suit is based
on contract withinj state, and state has strong interest in suit).
140. See supra note 139 (describing how interstate economy has influenced changes in
adjudicatory nexus requirements).
141. Because corporations are a fiction that is intended to be acted upon as though it
were a fact, courts resorted to legal fiction to imply presence or reqtiired consent to service
and suit to maintain adjudicatory jurisdiction over corporations. See International Shoe, 326
U.S. at 316, 318 (stating that corporate personality is fictional and can only be manifested by
activities carried on in its behalf by those authorized to act for it). In International Shoe, the
Court sought to move from artificial or mechanical standards for determining adjudicatory
jurisdiction to an assessment of the quality and nature of the activity in the state relative to
the fair administration of laws which due process was designed to ensure. See id. at 319
(explaining rationale for adopting minimum contacts standard). However, Justice Scalia has
noted that corporations still pose a problem in jurisdictional analysis, which is based primarily
upon de facto power over the defendant's person. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S.
604, 610 n.1 (1990) (discussing special jurisdictional problems that arise with out-of-state
corporations).
142. See supra note 138 (explaining requirement that defendant direct activities toward
state in order to support jurisdiction).
143. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987) (stating
that court must assess reasonableness of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant);
supra notes 126-44 and accompanying text (outlining requirements of modem due process
analysis for adjudicatory jurisdiction).
144. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (describing requirements of consent
and presence to establish adjudicatory jurisdiction).
145. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing loosening of physical presence
requirement for adjudicatory jurisdiction).
146. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1910-11 (1992).
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B. Jurisdiction to Tax
Like adjudicatory jurisdiction, states originally derived jurisdiction to
tax from a person's or entity's physical presence within the state. 47 Origi-
nally, tangibles were only taxable in the state of their permanent situs, and
intangibles were only taxable at the domicile of their owner. 4 This meant
that only one state could have the nexus to tax either a tangible or intangible
item. As the American economy became increasingly dependent upon inter-
state commerce, the fact that only one site could serve as a nexus for
taxation presented a problem for states wishing to tax all transactions and
goods having a relationship with the state. 49 In order to address the problems
arising from the interstate market, the Supreme Court established that an
entity could be doing business in more than one state and that all of the
states in which a corporation was doing business could have a nexus to tax
the entity?1° The Court found that the Due Process Clause required the
overall tax assessed to the corporation to be apportioned to approximate
the amount of business done within that particular state."'
The doing business standard for taxation required that a state establish
an interstate actor's presence by looking at both the amount of revenue
derived in the state and the amount of business transacted within a state.5 2
The touchstone for the Due Process Clause analysis was whether a tax
formula fairly apportioned the tax to the commerce carried on within the
state '3 and whether an entity received the benefits and protection conferred
147. See Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385, 398 (1903)
(recognizing general rule that power of state to tax is limited to subjects within its jurisdiction
or over which it can exercise dominion).
148. See Holby, supra note 119, at 1130 (describing evolution of taxation nexus standard).
149. See id. at 1130 (describing changes in tax jurisdiction theory as economy became
increasingly interstate).
150. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367-69 (1939) (establishing possibility that
corporation may have nexus with several states).
151. See Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 383 (1952) (holding that tax on revenues
earned within state by company engaged in interstate commerce satisfied requirements of Due
Process Clause if tax was fairly apportioned to commerce carried on within state); International
Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 419-21 (1947) (holding that tax formula which approx-
imated amount of intrastate sales and business performed by interstate company did not violate
Due Process Clause); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 86 (1948) (noting that
Due Process Clause was not obstacle to tax when state apportioned tax and taxed entity's
property was in taxing state). The Commerce Clause also requires fair apportionment of a tax
to reflect only intrastate activities. See e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 282-87 (1977) (detailing evolution of apportionment under Commerce Clause); Spector
Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1951) (explaining principle that under
Commerce Clause, state may tax interstate taxpayer's in-state business by applying tax rate to
fair proportion of taxpayer's overall business), overruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1976); International Harvester 392 U.S. at 421-23 (holding that
statute designed to arrive at fair conclusion as to value of intrastate business of interstate
actor did not violate Commerce Clause).
152. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment,
347 U.S. 590, 600-01 (1954) (examining amount of revenue derived by airline from in-state
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by the taxing sovereignty.5 4 The Supreme Court both affirmed and clarified
this test in Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co..' In Wisconsin, the Supreme
Court held that a state can tax consistently with the Constitution if the tax
relates to opportunities given by the state, to protection the state has
afforded to the taxed entity and to benefits that the state has conferred by
the fact of ensuring an orderly, civilized society.1 6 The test espoused in
Wisconsin is the same test found in the due process prongs of the current
tax jurisdiction test.1
7
The current tax jurisdiction test, set out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady,'8 encompasses both Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause
concerns.5 9 In applying the due process test found in Complete Auto, courts
have continued to look for actual physical presence and activity in the state
before extending jurisdiction to tax in the context of mail order sales.
1&6
The taxation of nonresident insurance companies represented the one ex-
ception to the physical presence standard. 61 However, courts have limited
service, frequency of service to state and airlines' facilities in state to determine that state had
fairly apportioned tax under Due Process Clause); see also Small, supra note 121, at 273
(discussing determination of presence for purposes of jurisdiction to tax tangible and intangible
items).
153. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (noting relationship between Due Process
Clause and apportionment of taxes levied upon interstate business).
154. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 368 (1939) (holding that when entity carries
on business in several states, each state provides protection and benefits and has power over
subject matter).
155. 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). In Wisconsin, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a statute that imposed a general corporate income tax on earnings of out-of-state corporations
attributable to their Wisconsin activities, in addition to a tax on the privilege of declaring and
receiving dividends derived from property located and business transacted in Wisconsin. Id. at
441. J.C. Penney challenged the tax on dividends, which delayed payment until the corporation
received the dividends, as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. The Court stated that the label of a tax was immaterial to analysis of jurisdiction-the
critical factor to analysis is the way in which the tax operates. Id. at 443-44. Asking if
Wisconsin had given anything for which it could ask return, the Court decided that the
incidence of the tax was tied to earnings which the state had made possible, and the tax was
justified. Id. at 445-46.
156. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
157. Compare supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text (describing due process require-
ments set out by Wisconsin) with infra note 192 and accompanying text (describing due process
elements of current tax jurisdictional test).
158. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See infra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing Complete
Auto test).
159. See infra note 194 and accompanying text (stating that Commerce Clause test for
jurisdiction to tax set out in Complete Auto encompasses due process concerns).
160. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text (discussing National Geographic); see
infra notes 197-98 (discussing D.H. Holmes Co.).
161. See McCray, supra note 1, at 286-88 (discussing judicial analysis of mail-order sales
of insurance and jurisdiction to tax). Due to the strong state interest in the health and safety
of state citizens, courts have treated mail order insurance companies without a physical presence
in the state differently from mail order companies purveying goods. Early cases required some
form of physical presence to impose tax collection. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578,
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this exception to mail order insurance companies and have emphasized that
the exception is justified by the strong state interest in regulating and taxing
insurance company activities. 62
Thus far, tax jurisdiction had not experienced a loosening of physical
presence standards akin to the changes in adjudicatory jurisdiction. 63 The
essence of tax jurisdiction analysis is a search for the protection, benefits
and control afforded to the taxed entity.16 There is no apparent reason
why an entity engaging in significant sales within a state without a physical
presence in the state could not obtain protection, benefits and control from
the state. 6 The Quill decision recognized this fact.
66
Courts traditionally have subjected tax jurisdiction to different standards
than adjudicatory jurisdiction. 67 The due process test for adjudicatory
593 (1897) (holding that Louisiana could not regulate contract that company had made beyond
territory and involved company which was not doing business in state); St. Louis Cotton
Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 349 (1922) (holding that while states may regulate
activities of foreign corporations within state, they cannot regulate or interfere with what these
corporations do outside); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81
(1938) (holding that Due Process Clause denies state power to tax or regulate corporation's
property and activities elsewhere). However, courts have recently extended tax and regulatory
jurisdiction over companies with no physical presence within the state. See Ministers Life &
Casualty Union v. Haase, 141 N.W.2d 287, 294-95 (Wis. 1966) (noting that while public
interest alone is not sufficient to give state jurisdiction over foreign insurance companies, great
concern and public interest do add significance to contacts with state which might not otherwise
be sufficient to meet standards of Due Process Clause); People v. United Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
427 P.2d 199, 209-10 (Cal. 1967) (holding that continuous solicitation of state residents by
mail coupled with substantial state interest in regulating insurance is sufficient to support
jurisdiction to tax and regulate mail order insurance companies). While the insurance company
in Ministers Life & Casualty had group leaders-uncompensated representatives of groups
interested in purchasing a group policy-who assisted in sales within the state, Ministers Life
& Casualty, 141 N.W.2d at 290, the insurance company in United Nat'l Life Ins. Co. had no
physical connection to the state. United Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 427 P.2d at 202. The California
and Wisconsin supreme courts decided both of these cases prior to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Bellas Hess, which reaffirmed the importance of the physical presence test.
See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text (discussing Bellas Hess physical presence test).
Moreover, the substantial state interest in taxing and regulating the insurance industry was a
dispositive factor in both state supreme court cases. See United Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 427 P.2d
at 209 (noting that state interest in regulating and taxing insurance transactions with state
residents was obvious); Ministers Life and Casualty Union, 141 N.W.2d at 291 (stating that
insurance business is permeated with public interest).
162. See supra note 161 (outlining cases addressing jurisdiction to tax in context of mail
order insurance sales).
163. See Holby, supra note 119, at 1131 (stating that due process clearly defines more
rigid standard for evaluation of tax jurisdiction than for adjudicatory jurisdiction); see also
Charles Rothfeld, Mail-Order Sales and State Jurisdiction. to Tax, 91 STATE TAx NoTEs 581
(1991) (noting that Supreme Court's approach thus far has been that out-of-state mail order
firm may be subjected to tax only if it maintains some physical presence in taxing jurisdiction).
164. See supra notes 147-62 and accompanying text (discussing tax jurisdiction test and
analysis).
165. See State Taxation of Mail Order Sales to State Residents by Out-of-State Firms, 60
U.S.L.W. 3511, 3511-12 (1992) (summarizing oral arguments heard by Supreme Court in
Quill). Justice Scalia asserted this very point during oral arguments in Quill and counsel gave
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jurisdiction is an analysis of whether an out-of-state defendant has pur-
posefully availed itself of the protection and benefits of the state.e6 The
due process test for tax jurisdiction is an analysis of whether the tax relates
to opportunities, benefits and protection provided to the entity by the
state. 6 9 Simply phrased, both analyses look to see whether the state has
given anything to the corporation for which the state can ask for something
in return. Therefore, although the Supreme Court has looked for more
substantial and continuous contacts with a state to support tax jurisdiction
than to support adjudicatory jurisdiction, the test applied to both is fun-
damentally the same. It only makes sense that contacts of a similar nature
should satisfy the test.
C. Interrelation of the Types of Jurisdiction
While the due process analysis of the various types of jurisdiction looks
similar, the analysis still requires different levels of contacts depending upon
the type of jurisdiction the state is attempting to assert. 70 Some commen-
tators state that the distinction between tax, regulatory and adjudicatory
jurisdiction should be irrelevant under the nexus test.'7 ' Courts, however,
continue to distinguish between the different types of jurisdiction, 7 2 and
these distinctions, rooted in the doing business requirement, are still a potent
no reason why benefits could not be provided to a company which was not present within a
state but which participated in active solicitation of a state market. Id.
166. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991), aff'd in part, 112 S.
Ct. 1904, 1910-11 (1992).
167. See Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 653 (1950) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (stating that activity necessary to sustain tax and maintain suit are not synonymous);
Kulick v. Department of Revenue, 624 P.2d 93, 97 (Or. 1981) (stating that nexus required to
tax and nexus required for personal jurisdiction are not functionally identical). The Oregon
Supreme Court held in Kulick that due process concerns in the assertion of adjudicatory
jurisdiction focus on the state's putting the nonresident to the inconvenience and possible
procedural drawbacks of an inappropriate forum, while the due process concerns with regard
to a tax law address a general class of persons on whom the state means to place the substantive
obligation to contribute to its revenues. Id. at 97. See also supra notes 124-30 and accompanying
text (outlining distinction between nexus required to sustain adjudicatory znd nexus to sustain
tax jurisdiction).
168. See supra notes 132-46 and accompanying text (describing due process requirements
for jurisdiction over person).
169. See supra notes 147-66 and accompanying text (describing due process requirements
for jurisdiction to tax).
170. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining differences between jurisdiction
to tax and jurisdiction over the person).
171. See McCray, supra note 1, at 286 (stating that because doing business is no longer
due process test to establish jurisdiction, theory that levels of doing business correspond to
levels of due process is no longer valid); see also Walter Nagel, The Emergence of a Single
Nexus Standard, 45 TAx NomS 327, 335 (1989) (saying that distinctions between requirements
for various types of jurisdiction are irrelevant).
172. See Kulick v. Oregon, 624 P.2d 93, 97 (Or. 1981) (refusing to equate adjudicatory
jurisdiction tests with tax jurisdiction tests); see also supra note 167 (discussing cases which
distinguish between required levels of activity needed to sustain different types of jurisdiction).
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force in due process analysis. Even though the Supreme Court eradicated
the physical presence test for jurisdiction to tax in Quill, the nexus require-
ments for all three types of jurisdiction are not necessarily synonymous.
1 7 3
Jurisdiction to tax will still require more contacts than regulatory or adju-
dicatory jurisdiction. 74 Thus, an examination of the relationship between
the types of jurisdiction reveals the potential implications of change in the
physical presence requirement for jurisdiction to tax.
i. Regulatory Jurisdiction and Tax Jurisdiction
The relationship between regulatory jurisdiction and tax jurisdiction,
while not a key issue in Quill, is important in analyzing the use tax collection
debate because tax jurisdiction requires more substantive contacts with the
state than regulatory jurisdiction. 175 Use tax collection statutes usually place
173. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1923 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that application of adjudicatory due process principles to tax jurisdiction does not
mean that due process standards for legislative [tax] jurisdiction and adjudicatory jurisdiction
are necessarily identical); see also infra notes 192-206 and accompanying text (discussing
potential change in tax jurisdiction analysis from Supreme Court consideration of Quill).
174. The use tax collection statutes passed by several states already recognize that juris-
diction to tax will require a substantial and regular solicitation of business within the state.
See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-407(12)(g) & 15(e) (West Supp. 1991) (requiring regular
or systematic solicitation by mail, catalog or media in order to impose use tax collection duty);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.43(12)(b) (West 1990) (looking for continuous, regular, seasonal or
systematic solicitation by mall and benefits from banking, financing and debt collection before
state imposes use tax collection duty); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-67-30) (1990) (imposing use tax
collection liability on retailers that purposefully or systematically exploit consumer market by
direct mall or unsolicited catalog distribution). In contrast, these same states extend adjudicatory
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations based upon as few as one contact with the state.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59B(a)(2) & (3)(B) (West 1991) (imposing personal
jurisdiction on nonresident corporation for tortious act in state or tortious act out-of-state if
defendant expects act to have in-state consequences and derives revenue from interstate
commerce); IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1991) (extending adjudicatory jurisdiction
over nonresident who entered contract or performed tortious act in whole or in part in-state);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (Supp. 1991) (imposing adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant that has entered contract or committed tort in whole or in part in-state).
175. Due process jurisprudence places fewer limits on a state's regulatory jurisdiction than
on its tax jurisdiction or its adjudicatory jurisdiction. See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,
253 (1946) (stating that taxes that touch upon commerce have always been more carefully
scrutinized and more consistently resisted than police power regulations of commerce); Holby,
supra note 119, at 1117 (noting that due process analysis of regulatory legislation, unlike that
of tax legislation, is fairly minimal). The Commerce Clause poses the primary impediment to
jurisdiction to regulate. See Holby, supra note 119, at 1117 (stating that critical issue for
regulatory control is Commerce Clause, whereas due process poses threshold issue for tax
jurisdiction).
Typically, states have required businesses carrying on a certain level of in-state activity
to register with the state and be qualified, as an exercise of regulatory authority. See McCray,
supra note 1, at 270 n.22 (stating that qualification is prerequisite for transacting substantial
business in-state). Qualification requirements may include consent to service of process, payment
of fees or subjection to certain state regulations. See Holby, supra note 119, at 1117 n.59
(describing possible requirements that states imposed upon, corporations for qualification).
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responsibility for the collection and payment of use taxes on the retailer .
7 6
Even though the state is technically forcing mail order companies into the
posture of tax collection, the statutes make the retailer directly liable for
payment of the tax regardless of whether the company succeeds in collecting
the tax.'" Therefore, courts often analyze the obligations imposed by use
tax collection statutes as if the state were assessing the tax upon the
retailer.178 While some decisions and commentators indicate that the state
is exercising regulatory jurisdiction when the state imposes a use tax collec-
tion duty, 7 9 the Supreme Court has most often referred to imposition of
this duty as an exercise of tax jurisdiction180 Indeed, even the parties
Although the level of contacts which constitutes doing business is higher for qualification than
for adjudicatory jurisdiction, it is not clear what level is required. Id. at 1123.
Regulatory jurisdiction also encompasses the reach of a state's police power or control
over the activities of out-of-state actors. Id. at 1123. The activities that constitute doing
business for purposes of the exercise of police power are often considerably less than those
required for qualification. Id. It is difficult to ascertain what level of contacts is necessary to
sustain jurisdiction to regulate. See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745, 750-51 (7th
Cir.) (observing that exercise of regulatory power requires less nexus than taxing power but
more than adjudicatory power), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524
F.2d 38, 42-43 (3d Cir. 1975) (applying adjudicatory jurisdiction nexus standard to mail order
retailer's objection to state regulation), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) (applying minimum contacts standard from
International Shoe when state's regulatory authority over out-of-state mail order insurance
corporation was in question). Where a strong state interest in regulating an industry is involved,
such as in the insurance industry, the threshold level of required contacts is lowered. See
Leonard E. Kust & Graham Sale, Jr., State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 46 VA. L. REv. 1290,
1305 (1960) (noting that where strong public policy intervenes, lower nexus threshold may be
required for jurisdiction to regulate). Thus, jurisdiction to regulate undergoes less scrutiny
than jurisdiction to tax. When a strong state interest is involved, the level of contacts required
is similar to the level required for adjudicatory jurisdiction. See id. Otherwise, jurisdiction to
regulate demands a mid-level of contacts-somewhere between jurisdiction to tax and adjudi-
catory jurisdiction. See Alden's Inc., 552 F.2d at 750-51 (postulating that regulatory jurisdiction
requires mid-level of contacts between adjudicatory and tax jurisdiction).
176. See supra note 7 (listing various state statutes which require out-of-state retailers to
collect use taxes on in-state sales and hold retailer liable for amount of tax due for remittance);
see also infra note 174 (describing judicial interpretation of use tax statutes as exercise of
states' jurisdiction to tax).
177. See supra note 7 (listing use tax collection statutes); infra note 171 (describing judicial
construction of use tax collection statutes which make mail order vendor liable for payment
of use tax).
178. See National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 757 n.9
(1967) (stating that while retailer was not person or entity being taxed directly, statute made
retailer directly liable for payment of tax whether or not retailer collected tax); Scripto v.
Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210 (1960) (observing that in event dealer fails to collect tax, dealer is
liable for tax payment); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954) (noting that
practical and legal effect of Maryland use tax collection statute was akin to making vendor
pay sales tax); see also Kust & Sale, supra note 175, at 1303-08 (describing cases concerning
problem of use tax collection as cases involving jurisdiction to tax).
179. See National Geographic Soc'y v. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 558 (1977)
(stating sole burden borne by out-of-state seller under use tax collection statutes is administrative
duty of collecting tax); Gillis, supra note 1, at 543-44 (opining that state is exercising regulatory
authority and not taxing authority when state requires out-of-state vendors to collect use taxes).
180. See supra note 178 (discussing cases which regarded use tax collection as exercise of
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involved in Quill treated the use tax collection duty as a tax issue.''
ii. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Tax
The differences between jurisdiction to adjudicate tax and jurisdiction
to tax are also critical to the due process analysis of the use tax collection
issue. The obligations imposed by adjudicatory jurisdiction and tax collection
are significaritly different. Under specific adjudicatory jurisdiction, the state
requires the defendant to submit to the jurisdiction of a state's courts only
for controversies arising from the defendant's contacts with the state.1s2 It
is often a one-time obligation.' Under a tax collection statute, a state
forces the company to undertake burdensome and costly tax collection
procedures for every sale it makes in the state. This tax collection burden,
although arising from a series of individual transactions, is comparable to
the burden imposed by general adjudicatory jurisdiction and requires a
greater level of commitment and effort than does a single court appear-
ance. ' Under general jurisdiction, the state requires a defendant to submit
to adjudicatory jurisdiction in a state for any suit, regardless of whether
the transaction giving rise to the suit took place in the state., 5 The obligation
is continuing and burdensome.
Moreover, the factors supporting tax jurisdiction in National Geo-
graphic, which dispensed with the requirement that activities giving rise to
jurisdiction to tax). Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion in Quill that it is difficult
to discern any principled basis for distinguishing between jurisdiction to regulate and jurisdiction
to tax. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1923 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
181. See Brief for Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D.
1991) (arguing that changes in adjudicatory jurisdiction control tax jurisdiction analysis and
problem in Quill is one of jurisdiction to tax), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992); Brief for
Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991) (approaching problem
as one of jurisdiction to tax, which unlike adjudicatory jurisdiction, should retain physical
presence requirement), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
182. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)
(defining specific jurisdiction to be jurisdiction over suits arising out of or relating to contacts
within state).
183. See supra note 182 (defining specific jurisdiction).
184. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (finding
general jurisdiction over Philippine company which had moved its headquarters temporarily
to United States during war). But see Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418 (holding series of sales
contracts with in-state companies and use of in-state banks did not meet requirements of
general jurisdiction); Charles Rothfeld, Mail-Order Sales and State Jurisdiction to Tax, 91
STATE TAX NoTEs 581, 585 (1991) (noting that subjecting out-of-state defendant to court
appearance and forum's laws is form of regulation and that use of injunctive or preventative
relief is potent method of controlling conduct). Incorporation in a state subjects a corporation
to both general adjudicatory and tax jurisdiction. See supra notes 121-22 (describing how
incorporation in state satisfies physical presence which gives state jurisdiction over corporation).
185. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.9 (defining general jurisdiction as state exercise
of personal jurisdiction over defendant in suit not arising out of or related to defendant's
contacts with forum). See generally Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101
HAv. L. REv. 610 (1988) (describing development of specific and general jurisdiction).
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tax jurisdiction must relate to the activity that the state is taxing, are similar
to the requirements of general jurisdiction.8 6 In National Geographic, the
Court justified imposition of the use tax collection burden by pointing to
National Geographic's substantial presence in the state and the location of
an office there.'17 A corporation's activities within the state have only
satisfied the test for general adjudicatory jurisdiction over a nonresident
corporation when the activities were substantial and continuous, and the
corporation was physically present within the state. 8 Thus, the level of
contacts necessary to support jurisdiction to tax is far more akin to the
level supporting general rather than specific adjudicatory jurisdiction. Even
though the Supreme Court applied the due process nexus test for adjudi-
catory jurisdiction to tax jurisdiction in Quill, tax nexus requirements should
continue to reflect the high level of contacts required to subject a corporation
to general jurisdiction. States already recognize the higher level of contact
needed to support jurisdiction to tax in their statutory schemes. 8 9 The
quantitative differences between adjudicatory jurisdiction analysis and tax
jurisdiction analysis do have constitutional significance, as recognized early
on by the doing business standards and by courts1 90 The Court has not
erased the distinctions between the level of contacts required for each type
of jurisdiction by applying adjudicatory due process standards to tax due
process nexus analysis.19'
IV. MODERN TAX DuE PROCESS ANALYSiS
As discussed, historical analysis of the application of the Due Process
Clause to state jurisdictional power reveals that courts have traditionally
not treated adjudicatory jurisdiction and tax jurisdiction equally. Just as
the Court took these distinctions into account, the Court considered the
changes that have taken place in tax analysis since the Court decided Bellas
Hess. The Supreme Court has effected significant changes in the framework
for tax jurisdictional analysis since it decided Bellas Hess. Modern tax
analysis of a state's power to tax out-of-state entities has involved a
Commerce Clause analysis, set out in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady. 92 In Complete Auto, the Supreme Court articulated a four-pronged
186. See supra notes 42-55 and accompanying text (describing holding and rationale of
National Geographic).
187. Id.
188. See supra note 184 (giving examples of general jurisdiction cases).
189. See supra note 174 (describing various state statutes imposing jurisdiction to tax and
jurisdiction over person).
190. See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text (describing doing business standards);
supra note 167 (describing how courts differentiate between various jurisdictional requirements).
191. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1923 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that repudiation of physical presence test for purpose of due process does not mean
due process standards for adjudicative jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction are necessarily
identical).
192. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). The issue in Complete Auto was whether sales taxes
1992]
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test for analyzing taxes on interstate business under the Commerce Clause. 9
Yet, even though the Complete Auto test seemed to encompass due process
requirements for tax jurisdiction such that satisfaction of the Complete
Auto test indicated that due process requirements had been met,'9 the Court
has continued to treat due process requirements as a distinct issue. For
instance, in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana 9 the Supreme Court
held, while applying the Complete Auto test, that a due process analysis
does not require that the amount of taxes a state collects from a company
assessed against an interstate corporation were constitutional because the statute assessed taxes
on interstate transactions. Id. at 277. The plaintiff, Complete Auto Transit, was engaged in
the business of transporting motor vehicles for General Motors to dealers in various states.
Id. Mississippi assessed sales taxes on Complete Auto Transit for the sale of transportation
services within the state, and Complete Auto Transit paid the taxes under protest. Id. at 276-
77. Rejecting prior cases which held that states could not apply sales taxes to activities which
were part of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court adopted a new test for evaluating taxes
on interstate business. Id. at 288-89. The Court reasoned that the privilege of doing interstate
business was not immune from state taxation and that a per se prohibition against taxing
activity which was part of interstate commerce was unreasonable. Id. at 286-89. Under the
new test for jurisdiction to tax, premised on Commerce Clause considerations, a tax is to be
sustained if the tax: (1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state,
(2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce and (4) is fairly
related to the services provided by the state. Id. at 279. The Supreme Court upheld the
Mississippi sales tax because it met the requirements set out by the new test. Id. at 289.
193. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1976). See supra note 192
(describing Complete Auto and giving language of four part test). The Supreme Court's
adoption of the Complete Auto test was significant. The Court had espoused the prevailing
doctrine prior to this decision in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951),
overruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 (1976). The Spector
doctrine, also formulated in response to a tax on interstate transportation, forbade the
imposition of taxes on purely interstate transactions. 340 U.S. at 609. The Court had considered
state taxes on business that was exclusively interstate in character to be an undue infringement
on the taxing power of the federal government, and these taxes were strictly forbidden, no
matter how fairly the tax was apportioned to reflect business within the state. Id.
194. See Amerada Hess Corp. v. New Jersey, 490 U.S. 66, 79-80 (1989) (stating that
Complete Auto test encompasses due process standards and holding that if tax satisfies all
four prongs of Complete Auto test, tax does not violate due process).
195. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). In Commonwealth Edison, Montana coal producers and their
out-of-state utility customers brought a Commerce Clause challenge to a Montana statute that
imposed a severance tax on each ton of coal mined in the state. 453 U.S. at 613. The coal
producers and customers did not dispute that the first requirement of the Complete Auto
test-that the taxed activity have a substantial nexus with the state-was satisfied because the
coal subjected to the severance tax was located within Montana. Id. at 617. However,
Commonwealth Edison did dispute the contention that the tax was fairly related to the services
Commonwealth Edison received from the state, the fourth requirement of the Complete Auto
test. Id. at 620. Commonwealth Edison argued that the amount of money the state received
in taxes from coal corporations far exceeded the value of the government services provided to
the coal mining industry. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not
require the amount of general revenue taxes collected from a particular activity to be reasonably
related to the value of the state government services provided to the activity. Id. at 622. The
tax burden merely has to be reasonably related to the extent of the taxpayer's contact with
the state-in other words, to the taxpayer's earnings that the state has made possible by
providing a civilized society. Id. at 625-26.
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for a particular activity correspond to the value of the state government
services provided to the activity.'9 In D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara,
197
the Court referred to a retailer's economic presence in the state in evaluating
a nexus under the Complete Auto test, but ultimately relied on the retailer's
actual physical presence in the state and Bellas Hess due process principles
to uphold jurisdiction to tax.'19 The Court relied upon the Bellas Hess
emphasis on physical presence when evaluating due process nexus concerns
in Goldberg v. Sweet,'9 and stated that receipt of interstate transmissions
was not sufficient to uphold jurisdiction to tax.200 The Supreme Court
mentioned that Commonwealth Edison, D.H. Holmes, and Goldberg rep-
resented the continuing vitality of the Bellas Hess due process test.20' The
fact that the Bellas Hess physical presence test survived Complete Auto
analysis further underscores the importance of the shift in due process
analysis demonstrated in Quill.
196. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 626 (1981).
197. 486 U.S. 24 (1988). In D.H. Holmes, the Supreme Court upheld a use tax levied on
the purchase of catalogs by a Louisiana corporation from an out-of-state vendor. 486 U.S. at
24. The corporation, D.H. Holmes, owned and operated thirteen deparment stores employing
5,000 workers throughout Louisiana. Id. at 26. Because the challenge to the use tax came
under the commerce Clause, the Cort applied the Complete Auto test. Id. at 30. In applying
the Complete Auto test, the Court rejected D.H. Holmes' contention that because the company
sent the catalogs in the mail, they were part of the stream of commerce and not subject to
taxation. Id. at 31. The Court held that the facts of the case met all four prongs of the
Complete Auto test. Id. at 32. The Court found that the use tax was fairly related to the
benefits provided by the state-the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test-because Louisiana
provided a number of services facilitating D.H. Holmes' sale of merchandise within the state,
including fire and police protection for the stores and public roads for customers. Id.
D.H. Holmes claimed that its distribution of catalogs in Louisiana was analogous to the
mail order vendor's activities in Bellas Hess. Id. at 33. Looking to Bellas Hess, the Supreme
court state that the mail order shipments in the two cases were not similar. Id. The Court
then stated that the claimed analogy ignored the vendor's significant economic presence in
Louisiana, with $100 million per year in sales, the retailers' physical presence manifested by
several stores, D.H. Holmes's connections with the state, and the direct benefits it received
from Louisiana in conducting its business. Id. at 32. The Court held that D.H. Holmes had
nexus aplenty with Louisiana and that imposition of the use tax did not violate the Commerce
Clause. Id. at 33-34.
198. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1988).
199. 488 U.S. 252 (1989). In Goldberg v. Sweet, taxpayers brought suit protesting a five
percent tax on interstate telephone calls. 488 U.S. at 257. Telecommunications retailers joined
in the suit because the state required them to collect and remit the tax on calls which originated
or terminated in Illinois and which were charged to an Illinois address for payment. Id. at
255-57. The Due Process Clause posed no problem for the tax collection aspect of the Goldberg
statute because the telecommunications retailer had a significant physical presence in Illinois.
Id. at 258 n.9. Rather, the dispute focused on whether Illinois had a sufficient nexus with the
taxable activity-the telephone calls-to satisfy the Commerce Clause. Id. at 256-57.
While the Court decided that telephone calls did have sufficient nexus with Illinois to
justify jurisdiction to tax, the Court noted that without the company's physical presence in
the state, the nexus would not be sufficient to satisfy due process concerns. Id. at 263.
200. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 263 (1989).
201. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1912 (1992).
19921 1213
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:1183
Lower courts and commentators alike have asserted that modern tax
analysis renders both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause
reasoning in Bellas Hess obsolete. 202 Yet, the Supreme Court made a special
point in Quill to distinguish Commerce Clause analysis for tax jurisdiction
from Due Process Clause analysis. 2 3 Although satisfaction of the nexus
requirements set out by the Commerce Clause might indicate ipso facto that
the due process nexus requirements are satisfied, satisfaction of the nexus
requirements under the Due Process Clause does not mean ipso facto that
Commerce Clause nexus requirements are met.204 With this shift in tax
analysis and the acceptance of economic contacts for due process analysis,
Commerce Clause nexus requirements could become more stringent than
Due Process Clause requirements. 25 Indeed, the physical presence require-
ment is still potent under Commerce Clause requirements for jurisdiction
to require mail order retailers to collect state sales taxes.206
VII. Tiim FUTURE OF DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTION TO TAX
Several developments justify the shift in due process analysis reflected
in Quill. First, the nature of the telecommunications industry has undergone
radical changes since 1967, and the retail market has become increasingly
interstate.2 7 Retailers simply have no need to establish a physical presence
in a state in order to make millions of dollars worth of sales. Second, the
increased market share of mail order retailers28 reflects the increasingly
202. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203, 209-10 (N.D. 1991) (applying
Complete Auto test to mail order use tax collection problem to conclude that foundational
basis of Bellas Hess was eroded), aff'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992); McCray, supra note
I, at 288-90 (arguing that Complete Auto test alters Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause
analysis for jurisdiction to tax).
203. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992) (stating that nexus
requirements of Due Process and Commerce Clauses are not identical because they are animated
by different constitutional concerns and policies).
204. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1909.
205. Id. The Court notes that the touchstone of due process nexus analysis is notice or
fair warning. Id. The fundamental concern for Commerce Clause analysis is a structural
concern about the effects of state regulation on the national economy. Id.
206. Id. at 1916.
207. See Brief for Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D.
1991) (describing evolution of technology available to mail order companies), aff'd in part,
112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992). Advances in computer software programming, database management,
fax machines and telephones have made it much easier for marketers to communicate with
the customer. It is possible that interactive voice response technology, which allows a customer
to place an order by just pressing a few buttons on a touch-tone phone, will be available
soon. Id. In fact, Quill already makes a computer software program available to its customers
which allows direct communication between Quill and the customer via computer modem. Id.
208. See McCray, supra note 1, at 266 (stating that in 1984, mail order retail sales
accounted for fourteen percent of all retail transactions and are growing faster than in-state
purchases); Geoffrey A. Campbell, High Court to Study Scope of State Taxes In Disputes
Valued at $3 Billion a Year, Tim BoND BUYER, Dec. 31, 1991, at 2 (citing that mail order
sales have steadily mounted since mid-1960's, growing 18.9 percent between 1988 and 1990,
to $57.75 billion from $48.3 billion); Jeanne Dugan Cooper, States Taxed by Catalog Issue,
NEWSDAY, June 18, 1991, at 31 (stating number of people shopping at home through mail-
order has increased 72 percent 1983 to 98.6 million people).
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interstate nature of our economy. In addition, advanced technology makes
it less complicated for mail-order companies to calculate and collect the use
tax, reducing the collection burden. 2 A corporation's physical presence in
the state no longer correlates to the amount of benefits it might receive
from the corporation. For instance, the presence of two independent con-
tractors soliciting orders within a state does not confer more benefits on a
corporation than access to millions of customers through phone lines and
the United States Mail.
21 0
In Quill, the Court has indicated its willingness to adapt to a changing
economy. However, the Court did uphold Bellas Hess on Commerce Clause
grounds while clarifying that the Due Process Clause poses no barrier to
congressional action addressing the use tax collection issue . 2 1 By upholding
Bellas Hess on Commerce Clause grounds, the Court has handed Congress
the responsibility for determining the constitutionality of use tax collection
statutes and for addressing the thorny problem of retroactive tax liability. 21 2
209. See Respondents' Brief, Quill (No. 91-194) (describing software technology available
to calculate tax on each transaction and integrate tax rate information directly into direct
marketers' own computerized billing system); see generally Ray Westphal, The Computer's
Role in Simplifying Compliance with State and Local Taxation, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1097 (1986)
(discussing computer technology that is designed to assist in tax calculation).
210. Justice Scalia, during oral arguments, asked counsel for Quill why a company with
a couple of independent contractors acting as sales agents in a state derived more benefits
from the state than a mail order retailer which sends catalogs into a state, deriving millions
of dollars of revenue and using state financial institutions to complete the sales. Counsel for
Quill replied that Bellas Hess had been well-reasoned, but did not explain why the benefits
derived from the in-state agents were greater than those derived from mail-order access to
state customers. Justice Scalia noted skepticism regarding separate tax treatment for the two
scenarios and remarked that the Court had overturned precedent in the past when the precedent
was based upon faulty reasoning. See State Taxation of Mail-Order Sales, supra note 165, at
3511-12 (noting Justice Scalia's skepticism regarding Bellas Hess's treatment of mail order
companies differently than small businesses which are forced to send sales representatives into
state to obtain business for purposes of use tax collection); Geoffrey A. Campbell, States'
Treasuries Could See Revenue Boosts if Supreme Court Overturns Two Tax Cases, Tim BOND
BUYER, Jan. 23, 1992, at 6 (describing oral argument exchange regarding distinction between
collecting tax on sales of items sold by field representatives and items sold over phone). The
Supreme Court's opinion in Quill recognized that the physical presence distinction was artificial
and led to irrational results. Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1910-11.
211. Justice O'Connor noted that the use tax issue might be better suited for Congress
because Congress could address the retroactivity issue. See infra note 212 (describing retroac-
tivity problem in overturn of Bells Hess). Chief Justice Rehnquist asked counsel for the State
of North Dakota if it would help Congress address the use tax issue if the Court ruled that
Bellas Hess was a Commerce Clause case. See State Taxation of Mail-Order Sales, supra note
165, at 3512.
212. Because some states passed statutes that require use tax collection by out-of-state
retailers several years ago, the Court's overturn of Bellas Hess could have imposed retroactive
tax liability on retailers who had refused to comply by asserting the protection of Bells Hess.
See e.g., ALA. CODE § 40-23-68(b)(5) (Supp. 1991) (becoming effective 4-30-86); IowA CODE
ANN. § 422.43(12) (West 1990) (becoming effective 7-01-88); NEB. Rxv. STATE. § 77-2702(21)
(1990) (becoming effective 10-01-87) ; Omao REv. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(H) (Anderson Supp.
1990) (becoming effective 10-05-87). The Supreme Court recently has addressed the retroactivity
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The onus is now on Congress to take action to bring use tax collection
requirements in line with twentieth century reality.
213
The most important task for Congress is the preservation of the tradi-
tionally higher standard required for jurisdiction to tax. While it is logical
to permit economic or technological contacts, such as telephone, mail order
or computer solicitation, to factor into the analysis of jurisdiction to tax,
the Due Process Clause still requires more contacts with a state to give rise
to tax jurisdiction than to give rise to adjudicatory jurisdiction. As historical
of the invalidation of tax schemes and has found that once a tax is invalidated, retroactive
relief must be granted to the taxpayer. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.
Ct. 2439 (1991) (holding that state could not apply invalidation of discriminatory state liquor
tax statute prospectively to deny taxpayer claims for refund and that state must provide
retroactive refunds to taxpayers); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,
496 U.S. 18, 39 (1990) (finding that Due Process Clause requires state to provide meaningful
backward-looking relief to taxpayers once court has declared tax to be unconstitutional).
Quill presented a different problem: whether tax collectors could be held retroactively
liable for taxes which were unconstitutional when assessed, but judged to be constitutional at
a later point in time. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), established a three
factor test to determine when prospective, rather than retroactive, application of a change in
the law was appropriate. The factors for consideration are: (1) whether the decision establishes
a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have
relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression; (2) whether the purpose of the new rule is
furthered by retroactive application; and (3) whether inequitable results would result from
retroactive application. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07. Given the treatment of Chevron in recent
decisions and the disparity of views of Supreme Court justices on the issue of retroactivity, it
is not at all clear whether the Chevron prospectivity test would have applied had the Court
overturned Bellas Hess in Quill. See generally Albin C. Koch, Beam Resolves Taxpayer Claims
under Davis but Quill Raises New Prospectivity Issue, 43 TAx ExEcuTrIVE 321 (1991) (discussing
recent decisions addressing retroactivity, views of various justices on issue of retroactivity and
potential outcome of Quill).
The overturn of Bellas Hess and consequent potential retroactive tax liability could have
brought great hardship to retailers who, relying on Bellas Hess, had failed to collect taxes.
Because collecting sales taxes due on purchases dating back several years from customers would
be virtually impossible, the mail-order firms would inevitably have had to bear the tax burden
themselves. See Brief for Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D.
1991) (stating that potential back-tax liability which would accrue from overturn of Bellas
Hess would wipe out many businesses), aff'd in part, 60 U.S.L.W. 4423 (U.S. May 26, 1992);
Amicus Curiae Brief by Tax Executives Institute in Support of Petitioner, Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991) (describing how retroactive application of any decision
curtailing protection afforded by Bellas Hess would inflict major hardship on interstate
commerce and unjustly reward states for passing statutes in defiance of Court's holdings); see
also Amicus Curiae Brief by Arizona Mail Order Company in Support of Petitioner, at
Appendix E, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1991) (estimating potential
retroactive liability by state that would result from overruling of Bellas Hess), aff'd in part,
60 U.S.L.W. 4423 (U.S. May 26, 1992).
213. See Gillis, supra note 1, at 556-65 (discussing potential federal legislation to provide
for use tax collection and remove Commerce Clause obstacle). Quill urged the Court to leave
any changes in tax jurisdiction to Congress, a body with more flexibility to fashion solutions
for the use tax problem. See Brief for Respondent, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 470 N.W.2d
203 (N.D. 1991) (arguing that Congress is appropriate body to regulate and control commerce
because cofigressiona consideration would provide adequate basis for creation of integrated
national rules), aff'd in part, 60 U.S.L.W. 4423 (U.S. May 26, 1992).
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analysis of tax and adjudicatory jurisdiction indicates, the distinction be-
tween the two types of jurisdiction recognizes the more substantial burdens
imposed by tax liability and prevents states from overstepping the bounds
of their authority. The higher level of nexus required for taxation is well-
founded in due process jurisprudence and should be reflected in whatever
action Congress takes and in future application of Quill. However, the
different levels of contacts may be maintained while eradicating the arbitrary
physical presence test.
It is fitting that the Court has left the details of use tax collection
requirements to Congress to decide. Congress can address the retroactivity
problem and any special burdens that might be placed on small mail order
retailers. 2 4 A joint effort from the Supreme Court and from Congress can
put the outdated physical test to rest and create a level playing field for all
retailers.
Catherine V. Lane
214. See Gillis, supra note 1, at 561-62 (discussing special burdens posed to small mail
order retailers).
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